Abstract: The quality and quantity of intergroup contact affects how outgroups are perceived. Positive interaction tends to have a humanizing effect of moral inclusion. Negative interaction instead tends towards dehumanization and moral exclusion. One avenue of intergroup contact that has been empirically underexplored is interaction in a market. Do markets generate moral sympathy, or do they allow us to ignore or deny the moral status of others? We create a measure of moral sentiment that captures the frequency, valence, and type of moral language used about an outgroup. We match our novel sentiment data to dyadic measures of market interaction to test if markets act as a (de)humanizing force. We find a positive relationship between market interaction and the use of (1) moral, (2) virtuous (but not vice), (3) bridging, and (4) bonding language to talk about a contacted outgroup. Our results suggest market interaction has a humanizing effect.

Abstract: The expansion of markets has generated significant material benefits. Yet some worry that this increase in wealth has come at a significant moral cost. Markets may crowd out or even corrupt existing moral values, causing moral deterioration. We test this hypothesis using both fixed effects and matching methods to estimate the impact of market institutions on a society’s moral values. Contrary to the deterioration hypothesis, we find that market-oriented societies have a greater aversion to unethical behavior, higher levels of trust, and are not significantly associated with lower levels of morality under any model specification. Furthermore, we find that becoming more market oriented does not cause a significant reduction in a society’s moral values. Together, our results suggest that being or becoming more market oriented does not cause moral deterioration.

Abstract: Studies of blockchain governance can be divided into analyses of the governance of blockchains (such as rules and power dynamics within a given network) and governance by blockchains (such as how blockchains can be implemented to improve self-governance of community-based peer production networks). Less emphasis has been placed on applications of distributed ledgers to public sector governance. Our review clarifies that the decentralization and distributive features that enable blockchains to link up loosely connected private organizations and public agencies to improve efficiency and transparency of government transactions. However, most blockchain applications lack clear advantages over the conventional digital recording of information. In addition, our review highlights that blockchain applications in public sector governance are potentially vast, though in most instances, the existing applications have not extended much beyond limited scale pilots. We conclude with a call for the construction of indexes of public sector implementations of blockchains, as none yet exist, as well as for additional research to understand why governments have not deployed blockchains more widely.

Abstract: A discipline is bound by some combination of a shared subject matter, shared theory, and shared technique. Yet modern economics is seemingly without limit to its domain. As a discipline without a shared subject matter, what is the binding force of economics today? We combine topic modeling and text analysis to analyze different approaches to inquiry within the discipline of economics. We find that the importance of theory has declined as economics has increasingly become defined by its empirical techniques. We question whether this trajectory is stable in the long run as the binding force of the discipline.

Abstract: Why do people bury items with their dead? We provide a theory of grave goods as a mechanism to mitigate internal conflict. Where inheritance laws are ambiguous and low-cost mechanisms for dispute resolution do not exist, deliberately destroying wealth can prevent conflict over the redistribution of assets following a death. Rather than engage in costly infighting over inheritance, the parties agree to mutual destruction through a shared cultural practice of grave goods. We test our theory using evidence from saga era Vikings.

Abstract: János Kornai developed soft budget constraint logic to explain the socialist world’s dysfunctional economies. We extend his logic to explain dysfunctional land reform in the developing world. International development organizations such as the World Bank provide support for land privatization to developing-country governments, softening their budget constraints. Softer budget constraints encourage developing-country governments to pursue land privatization even when its social value is negative. Kenya’s land reform program illustrates the soft budget constraint syndrome.

Abstract: According to conventional wisdom, privatizing the commons will create wealth. Yet in cases found throughout the developing world, privatizing the commons has destroyed wealth. To explain this phenomenon, we develop a theory of wealth-destroying private property rights. Privatization’s effect on social wealth depends on whether privatizing an asset confers net gains or imposes net losses on society. The decision to privatize, however, depends on whether privatizing an asset confers net gains or imposes net losses on property decision makers. When decision makers are residual claimants, these effects move in tandem; privatization occurs only if it creates social wealth. When decision makers are not residual claimants, these effects may diverge; privatization occurs if it benefits decision makers personally even if privatization destroys social wealth. We apply our theory to understand wealth-destroying land privatization in Kajiado, Kenya.

Abstract: Having empirically identified institutions as critical determinants of socioeconomic outcomes, social scientists are starting to turn their attention to empirically identifying sources of institutional change. Rational choice scholars offer two theories of such change: conflict theory and cooperation theory. We highlight crucial but easily overlooked methodological issues involved in attempting to evaluate these theories empirically. To do so, we critically examine Coleman and Mwangi’s study of property evolution among Maasai pastoralists in Kajiado, Kenya. Lessons from our examination, we hope, will help this burgeoning area of research proceed productively.